In an eort to improve diet and health outcomes, policymakers have increasingly turned to supply-side subsidies aimed at encouraging investment by supermarkets and other food retailers in traditionally underserved areas. This paper examines whether the U.S. federal government's New Markets Tax Credit (NMTC) has aected the entry of retail food establishments, and in turn food shopping and purchasing patterns, in low-income communities. To identify the impacts of the program, we take advantage of a discontinuity in NMTC funding generated by the formula used to determine the eligibility of census tracts for investment under the program. We nd that the NMTC Program has had modest, but positive impacts on supermarket entry in low-income communities. Based on household-level scanner data, there are no detectable eects on households' food purchasing patterns in aected neighborhoods, at least in the short run.
Introduction
In many countries, there is growing concern about the availability of aordable and nutritious food in low-income communities. To mitigate the possible negative diet and health implications of so-called low-income, low-access areas, policymakers have increasingly turned to supply-side subsidies aimed at encouraging investment by supermarkets and other food retailers in traditionally underserved communities. For example, several cities and states in the U.S. have attempted to address perceived food access problems by providing property tax abatements or other tax incentives to retail food establishments that locate in certain neighborhoods (Centers for Disease Control and Prevention 2011).
Evaluating the eects of these initiatives is dicult for several reasons. First, programs that aim to subsidize the entry of healthy food retailers tend to be fairly limited in scale. Second, nding suitable comparison groups is challenging given that communities eligible for subsidies are typically not randomly selected; as a result, it is often unclear if observed changes in areas that receive subsidized investment are attributable to the investment itself or to other, potentially unobserved neighborhood characteristics. Whether there is indeed a market failure that would justify government intervention is also not entirely clear; dierences in consumer preferences over alternative food options could give rise to measured dierences in access.
To the extent that place-based programs induce entry of supermarkets and other food retailers in low-income, low-access areas that would not have otherwise occurred, they can potentially break the endogeneity of rm entry with respect to consumer preferences and help to isolate the role of healthy food access in giving rise to observed dierences in food purchasing patterns and health outcomes across communities. To explore the potential for supply-side subsidies to improve food access and in turn address nutritional disparities, this paper examines the eects of the U.S. federal government's New Markets Tax Credit (NMTC) Program, a large-scale, national program that provides tax incentives to encourage private investment in low-income neighborhoods. In order to credibly identify the eects of the program, we exploit a discontinuity in NMTC funding generated by the formula used to determine the eligibility of census tracts for investment under the program.
The discontinuity creates quasi-experimental variation in subsidized investment around a certain income threshold; tracts with median incomes below the threshold are eligible to receive NMTC-subsidized investment, while tracts with median incomes above generally are not eligible.
We rst explore the NMTC Program's impacts on the entry of retail food establishments in lowincome areas across the country. Combining data from the U.S. Treasury on tax credit allocation and tract-level demographic and housing information with rich, comprehensive data on retail food establishments between 2004 and 2009 from A.C. Nielsen's TDLinx database, we compare outcomes among tracts within a narrow window around the income threshold determining eligibility under the program. This approach allows for causal inferences regarding the impacts of the NMTC on investment in the retail food industry, overcoming endogeneity problems that have arisen in past research on government incentives designed to promote commercial investment in general, and investment in retail food outlets in particular. We nd that the program induces modest, but positive growth in the local retail food industry, with the eects concentrated among supermarkets.
We then take advantage of household scanner data from Information Resources, Inc. (IRI) to explore whether NMTC-induced investment in low-income communities is associated with changes in food shopping and purchasing patterns among households. We nd that, while the arrival of new supermarkets may have led some households to redirect purchases that might have otherwise happened at convenience stores, it had no discernable eects on the healthfulness of consumers' grocery purchases. While changes in purchasing habits might take longer to emerge than the short time horizon we consider, the lack of any substantive eect is consistent with recent case studies suggesting that the entry of new grocery outlets in areas previously lacking in stores with healthy food options seems to have little impact on attitudes toward diet or on food purchasing decisions.
Overall, our results suggest that improvements in access alone are unlikely to dramatically narrow nutritional or diet-related health disparities. Broader eorts aimed at reducing prices of nutritious food items or shifting preferences in favor of such items may also be necessary to generate signicant and lasting eects on the diets and health of lower income households. This paper is organized as follows. The next section provides a brief review of the literature on low-income, low-access areas and discusses how our work relates to and builds upon past research.
After we describe the NMTC Program in Section 3, we outline our empirical strategy for estimating the eects of the program on food retailer entry as well as food purchasing patterns in aected communities in Section 4. We discuss the data we use in Section 5. Section 6 presents our main results as well as a number of robustness tests. Section 7 concludes.
2 Background
There exist large disparities in nutrition and diet-related health outcomes across dierent socioeconomic groups in the U.S. Preferences for less healthy foods, higher prices for healthy foods, and limited access to healthy foods could each contribute to these disparities. The latter has received particular attention among policymakers, who have emphasized the potential negative consequences of so-called low-income, low-access areas, also known as food deserts, in advancing legislation that seeks to increase access to healthier foods in communities that are currently underserved (Centers for Disease Control and Prevention 2011, Aussenberg 2014 , Handbury et al. 2016 ).
Substantial debate exists on the importance of access relative to other factors in generating observed nutritional disparities between groups (Wrigley 2002, Bitler and Haider 2011) . There is consistent evidence that access to healthy food is greater in wealthier and more educated neighborhoods (Powell et al. 2007 , Larson et al. 2009 , Bader et al. 2010 , Beaulac et al. 2009 , Ver Ploeg et al. 2009 , and that poor households tend to eat a less healthy diet Currie 2001, Cutler and Lleras-Muney 2010) . Moreover, a number of largely cross-sectional studies have found a correlation between greater access to healthy foods and better dietary quality as well as a lower incidence of chronic health conditions (Li et al. 2009 , Caspi et al. 2012 , Dubowitz et al. 2012 , Auchincloss et al. 2013 ).
However, it does not immediately follow that improving access to healthy food in lower income and less educated communities would reduce nutritional and health disparities, since dierences in consumption patterns could be driven as much, if not more, by dierences in preferences and/or price sensitivities. Indeed, using household data on food purchases, Kyureghian et al. (2013) nd that densities of supermarkets and other retail outlets have little eect on fruit and vegetable purchases.
In a comprehensive study of food purchases made between and within stores by higher and lower income households, Handbury et al. (2016) also nd that dierences in access play only a minor role in explaining observed dierences in food expenditure patterns. They contend that dierences in preferences or price sensitivities likely account for most of the disparities, which in turn suggests that improving access may be expected to have only small eects on actual food consumption habits and thus diet-related health outcomes.
Several recent case studies on the food consumption and health eects of single store openings 4 in perceived food deserts corroborate these ndings. For example, Cummins et al. (2014) nd that a new supermarket in an underserved community in Philadelphia improved residents' perceptions of food availability, but did not induce changes in reported healthy food consumption or body mass indices. Elbel et al. (2015) similarly nd that a new supermarket in a previously underserved area in New York City had no discernable eects on the amounts of healthful or unhealthful foods kept at home or on children's diets in the aected neighborhood. However, in case studies on supermarket openings in other cities in the UK and U.S., Wrigley et al. (2002 Wrigley et al. ( , 2003 and Weatherspoon et al. (2013 Weatherspoon et al. ( , 2015 document positive, albeit modest eects of improved access on healthy food expenditures among households in distressed communities. In all of these case studies, however, one might be concerned about both the generalizability of the results as well as the non-random selection of neighborhoods by supermarkets.
Our study takes a dierent approach than past research not only by using data on a large number of retail food store openings nationwide, but also by taking advantage of quasi-experimental variation in the location of this investment generated by particular features of the NMTC Program.
In previous work on food deserts that exploits variation over time or across geographies in nutritious food availability, the endogeneity of food retailer location decisions with respect to local food demand could bias estimates of greater food access on the consumption of nutritious food. Our empirical approach exploiting discontinuities in the formula used to determine neighborhood eligibility for NMTC subsidies is aimed at breaking this endogeneity, in turn allowing us to more credibly estimate the impacts of healthy food access on dietary outcomes. The results of this research are informative as to not only the ecacy of place-based policies in improving food access in areas with a perceived lack of availability of healthy and aordable food, but also the extent to which improving access alone might help to narrow nutritional and diet-related health disparities across dierent socioeconomic groups. 6 Any tract with a poverty rate of at least 20% also qualies. A small number of low-population and 2 More information on the NMTC Program can be found in Freedman (2012) , Abravanel et al. (2013) , and on the CDFI Fund's website at www.cdfund.gov.
3 The tax credit totals 39% of the original investment and is claimed over a period of seven years. CDEs are domestic corporations or partnerships that demonstrate a primary mission of serving or providing investment capital to low-income communities or persons, and that maintain accountability to residents of low-income communities through representation on a governing or advisory board to the entity. 6 For tracts outside MSAs, only the statewide MFI is relevant in determining the income ratio. 6 rural, high out-migration tracts also qualify.
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During the 2000s, 39% of the 65,443 tracts in the U.S. qualied as LICs. Nearly all that qualied (98%) qualied either on the MFI ratio criterion or on the poverty rate criterion. Of those that qualied on one of these two criteria, the vast majority (95%) qualied on the MFI ratio criterion.
The result is a discrete drop-o in tract eligibility at the 80% MFI ratio cuto; the percentage of tracts designated as LICs falls from 100% among tracts below the cuto to 11% among tracts with MFI ratios between 0.8 and 0.9. This nonlinearity in eligibility generates quasi-exogenous variation in the location of NMTC-subsidized investment, variation that we can use to identify the causal eects of that investment on local retail food markets.
Improving access to healthy foods in underserved communities was not initially a goal of the NMTC Program. However, investment in food production and distribution businesses are eligible uses of NMTC funds as long as the assets of the businesses are located in LICs. A sizable fraction of QLICIs during the 2000s were in retail food, which is attributable to several features of the industry.
8 First, grocers are unlikely to violate program rules on excessive working capital. Second, most of the business activities that are not eligible for NMTC nancing (e.g., gambling, tanning salons, and liquor) are either seldom combined with food retailing or represent a suciently small share of revenues as to not disqualify them for nancing. Third, supermarkets do not change ownership as frequently as many businesses, which means that the seven-year NMTC period is less problematic than for businesses in other sectors (Reinvestment Fund 2011) . In response to the Obama administration's Healthy Food Financing Initiative (HFFI) and building on the perceived track record of the NMTC in improving food access in underserved communities, CDEs began to be asked in their applications for NMTC allocations to describe any projects that would increase access to fresh and healthy food for low-income populations beginning in 2011. Given that the HFFI has only existed several years, and the fact that it incorporated other strategies aimed at improving the supply of healthy food in low-income areas independent of the NMTC, we focus only 7 Low-population tracts have populations less than 2,000, are located in federal Empowerment Zones, and are contiguous with another LIC. Rural, high out-migration tracts are located outside MSAs, have MFI not exceeding 85% of statewide MFI, and have net out-migration between 1980 and 2000 of at least 10%.
8 Determining the exact fraction is dicult given that some CDEs provide no or only vague descriptions of their investments. Based on business descriptions provided, over 6% of QLICIs are explicitly in retail food. This is a lower bound, however, since some of those investments in commercial real estate development could include retail food. Of those projects reporting tenant businesses in telephone surveys, 14% reported grocery stores, making it the second most common type of tenant business (Abravanel et al. 2013 ). 7 on NMTC-subsidized investment through 2009 in this paper.
Despite a growing body of research on policies that provide tax or other incentives to encourage business investment in certain geographic areas, there is substantial debate on the eectiveness of these place-based programs in spurring commercial development (Neumark and Simpson 2015) . Freedman (2012 Freedman ( , 2015 examines the eects of investment subsidized under the NMTC Program on conditions within targeted neighborhoods and nds positive, albeit modest impacts. However, Freedman's focus is primarily on aggregate employment and housing conditions in aected communities. Harger and Ross (2016) study whether the NMTC had important eects of on the entry and expansion of establishments across dierent broad industries and nd that it had a disproportionate eect on manufacturing and retail. However, they do not examine its impacts on retail food specifically, nor do they consider other community-level impacts of the subsidized investment beyond its eects on establishment entry and employment growth.
9
Reasons frequently cited for the dearth of retail food investment in low-income neighborhoods include poor infrastructure, zoning issues, crime, trac patterns, parking, and a lack of large parcels of land (Food Marketing Institute 1998, Short et al. 2007 , Ver Ploeg et al. 2009 ). To the extent that the NMTC helped to overcome some of these barriers and encouraged expansion in the retail food industry either through new entry or growth among incumbents, associated improvements in access to high-quality and aordable food could have important health consequences for residents of these communities.
Empirical Strategy
In this section, we outline our strategy for identifying the causal eects of supply-side subsidies on food access, and in turn the eects of quasi-exogenous changes in food access on food shopping and purchasing patterns. In order to identify these eects, we take advantage of the formula structure of the NMTC, and specically the cutos determining the eligibility of census tracts for NMTCsubsidized investment.
9 Notably, Grossman (2015) considers the health and fertility impacts of the federal Empowerment Zone Program.
He nds large positive eects on infant health, which he argues are the result of increased investment in children owing to higher parental wages in aected communities. However, Horn et al. (2016) nd little evidence that higher local minimum wages lead to improvements in worker health.
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The basic regression of interest is
where y i is the outcome y for tract i, N M T C i is the amount of NMTC-subsidized investment in tract i, and X i is a vector of initial tract characteristics. The main parameter of interest is β 1 , relating the amount of NMTC investment to outcomes of interest. However, using OLS to estimate this regression is likely to yield a biased estimate of β 1 , as certain unobserved features of neighborhoods may inuence the likelihood of receiving NMTC investment and independently aect outcomes.
To address this endogeneity issue, we follow Freedman (2012) and exploit a regression discontinuity (RD) design. Specically, we focus on a select group of tracts close to the 80% MFI ratio cuto that largely determines eligibility for subsidies under the NMTC Program. Tracts immediately on either side of the cuto are likely to be similar on both observed and unobserved dimensions, except that those right below the threshold are eligible for NMTC-subsidized investment while those right above are generally not eligible. Given this, any discontinuity in outcomes for tracts near the cuto can be attributed to a causal eect of NMTC-subsidized investment.
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The rst-stage regression for the RD design can be written as
and, substituting (2) into (1), the reduced-form regression is
where m i is the fraction of households in tract i with incomes below 80% of area MFI (the running variable), LIC i takes a value of 1 if tract i qualies as an LIC based on the threshold and a value of 0 otherwise, and f (m i ) is a cubic polynomial in the running variable relative to the 80% cuto where the coecients are permitted to vary above and below the cuto. Because this model is 10 Notably, the formula discontinuity approach we adopt is distinct from a spatial or border discontinuity approach that would involve using ineligible tracts that neighbor LICs as controls. Unlike the latter approach, our empirical strategy mitigates bias stemming from spatial spillovers, since control tracts (i.e., those that just barely failed to qualify as LICs) are not necessarily geographically close to treated tracts. 9 just-identied, the IV estimate of β 1 in (1) isγ 1 /α 1 . 11
For the RD design to be valid, any unmeasured determinants of outcomes must evolve smoothly through the MFI ratio cuto that largely determines eligibility for NMTC-subsidized investment.
One possible threat to this would be unobserved sorting of tracts around the cuto. Such sorting of neighborhoods around the threshold is highly implausible in this context, as the data determining LIC status during the 2000s were collected before but released only after the NMTC Program was signed into law. Therefore, not knowing the relevant thresholds, local ocials could not have manipulated census returns to ensure eligibility. Meanwhile, not having the census data available yet, federal legislators could not have chosen the cutos to specically include some tracts and not others (Freedman 2012, Harger and Ross 2016) . Density tests and checks for covariate balance (discussed in more detail in Section 5.2) further suggest that no sorting occurred around the threshold.
Importantly, the RD estimates are local average treatment eects and may not generalize to a broader sample of neighborhoods. Indeed, it is unlikely to be the case that the eects of subsidized investment of the type nanced by the NMTC Program would be the same in very auent or very poor tracts as it is in the moderately poor tracts we consider in our main analysis. However, these moderately poor tracts are arguably of particular interest from a policy perspective, as private businesses, and especially retail food rms whose customer bases and pools of potential employees tend to be highly localized, are more likely to be swayed by government subsidies to locate in moderately poor neighborhoods than in severely distressed communities (Pothukuchi 2005) .
Data

Data Sources
The data used in this study are derived from several sources. First, baseline neighborhood characteristics come from the 2000 Decennial Census. These data include a host of census tract-level demographic variables (population, racial and ethnic composition, age distribution, educational attainment, and household size) as well as housing variables (number of units, share vacant, share occupied, share owner-occupied, share with a mortgage, median age of units, and median number of 11 For a comprehensive treatment of RD designs, see Lee and Lemieux (2010 13 The data include the exact location of each store, which in turn can be mapped to census tracts. The data also report information on each store's estimated size, estimated sales, and estimated number of employees. For the purposes of this paper, we follow Hosken et al. (2016) and dene supermarkets as grocery stores as well as wholesale club stores, although the results are very similar excluding wholesale club stores.
For information on food shopping and purchasing patterns, we take advantage of IRI's InfoScan Consumer Network Database. This database is derived from the National Consumer Panel, a joint venture between IRI and Nielsen. In addition to a number of household characteristics, the Consumer Network Database provides rich data on household food shopping trips and purchases.
14 Households in the survey report information about their shopping destinations and scan universal product codes (UPCs) on products purchased from all stores. We obtained geographic identiers for households' residences that allowed us to assign them to census tracts.
Sample and Descriptive Statistics
For our main analysis, we focus on a narrow sliver of tracts around the 80% MFI ratio cuto that largely determines eligibility for NMTC investment. Figure 1 shows the number of tracts in each percentage point bin of the MFI ratio between 0.6 and 1, which encompasses the main sample (0.7 to 0.9) as well as larger windows considered in robustness tests. The lines represent cubic ts through the points, separately estimated on either side of the 0.8 cuto. As the gure makes clear, the density is smooth at the cuto; that is, there is no evidence of any bunching of tracts on either side of the threshold that would suggest that sorting had occurred around the cuto that might invalidate the RD design. McCrary (2008) density tests conrm that there is no statistically 12 Hanner et al. (2015) and Hosken et al. (2016) describe these data in detail. 14 Zhen et al. (2015) describe these data in detail. signicant discontinuity at the threshold.
In Table 1 Table 2 . In each of the regressions, we use a cubic control function and include county xed eects. In the regression appearing in column (2), we also control for the baseline demographic and housing variables listed in Panel A of Table 1 . The standard errors shown in the table are clustered at the county level, which allows for arbitrary correlation in errors within county but assumes that they are independent across counties.
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The rst-stage results suggest that LICs receive on average about $900,000 more in NMTC investment compared to tracts just above the threshold. The highly statistically signicant eect is similar with and without tract-level demographic and housing controls. The results are nearly identical excluding county xed eects and with alternative control functions as well.
16 These rst-stage results echo those of Freedman (2012 Freedman ( , 2015 , which focused on the impacts of NMTC investment on neighborhood composition and commuting patterns. To the extent that a portion of the investment was going to the retail food industry, the NMTC also generates quasi-experimental variation in food access in low-income communities. We turn to the specic eects of the NMTC on the entry of retail food establishments in the next section.
The Eects of the NMTC on Entry and Expansion in the Retail Food Industry
In Figure 4 and Table 3 , we present results examining the eects of the NMTC on retail food establishment entry and expansion. 16 See Appendix Table A1 . Freedman (2012) also presents a battery of additional tests. F-statistics for the excluded instrument range from 10.9 to 11.5, indicating that the instruments are reasonably strong.
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In Table 3 , we attach numbers (and standard errors) to the discontinuities (or lack thereof ) depicted in Figure NMTC-subsidized projects include a supermarket (Abravanel et al. 2013 ), this would imply that about 65% of those supermarkets would have located in a low-income neighborhood even in the absence of any subsidies. The other roughly 35% of the grocery stores may represent new retail food industry activity generated by the NMTC Program, but could also have been merely redirected from higher-income communities into low-income communities.
In line with the results in column (1) of Table 3 suggesting that NMTC-subsidized investment is associated with growth in the number of supermarkets, the results in column (2) point to gains in supermarket employment in aected communities. The IV estimate implies that $1 million in NMTC investment increases employment at supermarkets by about 8 workers. Obviously, NMTC investment occurs through a variety of channels outside retail food, so interpreting the program's relatively small impacts on the number of supermarkets and employment at supermarkets as its sole eects is misguided. The results do, however, point to a meaningful, if modest, eect of the 17 Employment at convenience stores is not available in the TDLinx data.
14 program on supermarket industry expansion.
Convenience stores are less likely to oer the aordable and nutritious food options that are perceived to be absent in low-income, low-access areas. They also lack most of the features of supermarkets that make the latter an attractive investment for CDEs that leverage NMTC funds.
As the third column of Table 3 shows, NMTC investment has no statistically or economically meaningful eect on the number of convenience stores in low-income communities.
The estimated eects of the NMTC on the retail food industry are robust to alternative specications and samples. For example, as shown in Table A2 Additionally, some NMTC funds were used to subsidize the establishment or expansion of health care facilities in low-income communities (Abravanel et al. 2013) . In a study on CDE investment activity, the NMTC Coalition (2014) reported that between 2003 and 2012, 9.6% of NMTC projects were in the health care industry. To the extent that new health care centers provided any outreach or counseling to residents about diet choices, they would also likely serve to increase the amount of healthy food purchased.
Given the previous results, a nal plausible channel by which NMTC investment could aect food purchasing patterns would be through its eects on food access.
18 We test this rst by examining whether there are changes in the frequency of shopping trips to or dollars spent at supermarkets and convenience stores among households in eligible communities. Next, we explore if and how NMTC investment aected the composition of food purchases, and specically whether it shifted household expenditures toward healthier foods.
We use household-level survey and scanner data from IRI to carry out these tests. Unfortunately, sample sizes in the IRI are substantially smaller prior to 2008, so we cannot compare changes in outcomes within tracts or within households before and after NMTC-subsidized investment using these data. We instead focus on dierences in levels in post-treatment outcomes between households located in tracts immediately on either side of the 80% MFI threshold (i.e., within the same 20
percentage point window used in the previous regressions). To the extent that households living in neighborhoods within a narrow window around the cuto are not systematically dierent, using levels as opposed to changes should not introduce bias. However, the estimates will reect variation in shopping and purchasing patterns driven by changes in the composition of residents in the wake of LIC designation as well as changes in the behavior of existing residents. To partially address the question of how compositional changes might be aecting the results, we present estimates based on outcomes measured at the household level, where we can additionally control for individual household characteristics.
In the results presented here, we use outcomes measured in 2012. This has the benet of allowing for some lag (albeit a modest one) in the impact of NMTC-subsidized on food shopping and purchasing behavior. It also maximizes the number of survey respondents with usable data, 
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In Panel A of Table 4 , we show reduced-form results for the number of supermarket trips per month (rst two columns) and convenience store trips per month (last two columns) using our RD sample. The rst and third columns show estimates controlling for the cubic control function, county xed eects, and baseline (year 2000) tract demographic and housing characteristics; the second and fourth columns present estimates in which we additionally control for household-specic characteristics (specically, household size, household income, race, ethnicity, number and ages of children in the household, educational attainment levels, employment and occupation dummies, marital status, and whether the household rents or owns their home). The controls for household characteristics help to address any dierences in the composition of households across areas, including those driven by NMTC-induced changes in neighborhood amenities.
As is evident in Panel A of Table 4 , there is little evidence that LIC status is associated with any change in the average frequency with which people living in the tract visit a supermarket.
Conditioning on baseline tract-level characteristics, we nd that LIC status is associated with 0.007 fewer monthly supermarket trips on average. Adding household-specic characteristics to the regression attenuates the eect to 0.002 fewer supermarket trips per month per household. Both point estimates are within one-twentieth of one percent of the typical 4.2 supermarket visits per month among households in our sample. In contrast, the results in columns (3) and (4) of Panel A in Table   19 There are 12,443 tracts represented in this sample. In Appendix Table A3 , we show the reduced-form estimates of the eect of LIC designation on supermarket and convenience store growth for this restricted sample. The results are very similar to the main results presented in the previous subsection; LIC status is associated with a statistically signicant 0.085 additional grocery stores and 7.5 additional grocery store workers on average in the restricted sample (compared to 0.058 and 7.0 for the full sample). Using levels as opposed changes in supermarkets and convenience stores also yields qualitatively similar results.
20 We do not weight the regressions using IRI's projection weights, which are not designed to ensure representativeness for the particular geography on which we focus. However, for most outcomes, the results are not qualitatively dierent when we weight the regressions. Additionally, following our practice in previous sections, we cluster standard errors at the county level in the regressions presented in this section; the standard errors are similar, but typically smaller when we cluster at dierent geographic levels (such as tract).
4 suggest that households in tracts eligible for NMTC-subsidized investment make about 0.18 fewer visits per month to convenience stores, a statistically signicant change that corresponds to a 46% reduction in the frequency of convenience store visits. This change is similar regardless of whether we control for household characteristics.
The results in Panel A of Table 4 hint that households in areas that receive new supermarkets, while not increasing the frequency of supermarket shopping trips, may be shifting some of their purchases from convenience stores to supermarkets. The results in Panel B of Table 4 provide one indication that this could in fact be occurring. Relative to households in barely ineligible neighborhoods, households in NMTC-eligible neighborhoods spend on average $4 more at supermarkets per month on average. Meanwhile, households spend $3 less at convenience stores per month on average. While neither estimate is statistically signicant at conventional levels, the observed pattern of spending is consistent with some shifting of purchases away from convenience stores and toward supermarkets.
To the extent that households in aected neighborhoods are reallocating purchases toward supermarkets, we might expect it to show up in food expenditure patterns, and specically the relative amount of nutritious food purchased. In Panel C of Table 4 , we show reduced-form results for the healthfulness of food expenditures by households. We follow Volpe et al. (2012) to construct scores that capture the extent to which a household's expenditures on food deviate from the recommendations of the USDA's Center for Nutrition Policy and Promotion (CNPP). The CNPP determines food plans for households that help to ensure they meet the USDA's Dietary Guidelines for Americans. These recommendations vary with household composition (specically, the presence and age of adult males and females in the household, as well as the presence and age of children in the household), which we adjust for using information in the IRI data. Based on these household recommendations and the observed expenditures by households on 23 food categories, we assign each household in the data a score that reects the degree to which that household adhered to the USDA recommendations. The score is calculated as
where the subscript j denotes the household, h the household type (the basis for the USDA's recommended food expenditure shares), and c the food category, and where ExpShare is the observed expenditure share of the household and RecExpShare is the share recommended under the USDA guidelines for a household of that type. This measure penalizes households for expenditures above or below the recommended amount in any particular category. We also assume in calculating this measure that households report all purchases, and therefore assign an expenditure share of zero in cases where we do not observe any purchases of food in a particular category. However, we also
show results using a measure in which we do not include categories for which no purchases were made in a given month.
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The mean Basket Score in 2012 among households in the 20 percentage point window around the 0.8 cuto that largely determines eligibility for NMTC-subsidized investment was 5.9. As shown in the rst two columns of Panel C of Table 4 , there is no discernable dierence in this score among households in neighborhoods just above the cuto relative to those just below the cuto; including both neighborhood and household controls, households in a NMTC-eligible neighborhood had scores 0.026 higher than those in ineligible neighborhoods, a dierence that is both economically small and statistically insignicant. Even the upper bound of the 95% condence interval around the point estimate (a 0.19 higher score in NMTC-eligible communities) would only represent a small (9% of a standard deviation) dierence in the Basket Score. As shown in columns (3) and (4) of Panel C, the results are qualitatively similar when we drop categories with zero expenditures (in which case the mean basket score is 7.8).
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Overall, our ndings suggest that, to the extent that the NMTC Program is inducing supermarket entry in low-income communities, the resulting increase in food access is not having large eects on healthy food purchasing patterns. This may in part be because the NMTC is only prompting minor locational shifts for many grocery stores that take up the subsidy, leading to large changes in the menu of food buying options for only a small segment of the population. However, the fact that place-based programs like the NMTC will generally be associated with some degree of crowd-out and potentially only small changes in business siting merely highlights another reason supply-side 21 We nd similar results to those shown using a measure that does not penalize households for too little of an unhealthy purchase and too much of a healthy purchase. We also explored simpler, but less concise and arguably more arbitrary measures such as the absolute amount and share of expenditures on fresh fruit and vegetables, or on salty snacks and desserts. The estimated impacts on these measures were similarly small and statistically insignicant.
22 These results are consistent with other qualitative evidence indicating that residents of areas with limited access to healthy food purchase most of their unhealthy food not at convenience stores, but at supermarkets (Vaughn et al. 2016 ).
subsidies of this type are unlikely to be the most eective policy lever by which to address major nutritional disparities. Importantly, though, the results above only capture changes in food purchasing behavior within aected communities in the short-run, and the impacts of improved access to healthy food on buying patterns may take longer than a few years to materialize. However, to the extent that NMTC-subsidized investment in communities might be expected to improve observed healthy food purchasing patterns through a number of channels, the lack of any estimated reducedform eect implies that such place-based interventions may not be sucient to dramatically alter diet-related health behaviors.
Conclusions
In an eort to improve diet and health outcomes, policymakers have increasingly turned to supplyside subsidies aimed at encouraging investment by supermarkets and other food retailers in traditionally underserved areas. This paper examines whether the U.S. federal government's NMTC Program has aected the entry of retail food establishments in low-income communities and whether there have been subsequent changes in food shopping and purchasing patterns among households in those neighborhoods. In order to identify the impacts of the program, we take advantage of a discontinuity in NMTC funding generated by the formula used to determine the eligibility of census tracts for subsidized investment under the program.
Our results suggest that the NMTC Program has had modest, but positive impacts on supermarket entry in low-income communities. This is not to suggest that the NMTC necessarily increased the number of supermarkets on aggregate, as many of the supermarkets that located in traditionally underserved communities with the help of preferable nancing terms made possible by the NMTC might have otherwise located elsewhere. Nonetheless, the results suggest that supply-side subsidies can be a useful tool to at least redirect investment into certain targeted communities.
Whether this is desirable from a policy perspective depends on the extent to which subsidized investments have greater social returns in low-income neighborhoods as compared to the other neighborhoods in which they might have otherwise located. The potential positive health consequences of new grocery stores in low-income, low-access areas are one channel by which such social returns could be realized. However, our results suggest that supermarkets, along with any other amenities 20 or changes in neighborhood composition that come with NMTC-subsidized investment, do not have measurable eects on households' food buying patterns, at least in the short run. While changes in purchasing habits in favor of healthier foods may take longer to materialize than our limited time horizon allows, the results imply that improving access alone is unlikely to be sucient to bring about any signicant narrowing of nutritional disparities across communities. 
